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Active inference is a general framework for perception and action that is
gaining prominence in computational and systems neuroscience but is less
known outside these fields. Here, we discuss a proof-of-principle implemen-
tation of the active inference scheme for the control or the 7-DoF arm of a
(simulated) PR2 robot. By manipulating visual and proprioceptive noise
levels, we show under which conditions robot control under the active infer-
ence scheme is accurate. Besides accurate control, our analysis of the internal
system dynamics (e.g. the dynamics of the hidden states that are inferred
during the inference) sheds light on key aspects of the framework such as
the quintessentially multimodal nature of control and the differential roles
of proprioception and vision. In the discussion, we consider the potential
importance of being able to implement active inference in robots. In particu-
lar, we briefly review the opportunities for modelling psychophysiological
phenomena such as sensory attenuation and related failures of gain control,
of the sort seen in Parkinson’s disease. We also consider the fundamental
difference between active inference and optimal control formulations, show-
ing that in the former the heavy lifting shifts from solving a dynamical
inverse problem to creating deep forward or generative models with
dynamics, whose attracting sets prescribe desired behaviours.1. Introduction
Active inference has recently acquired significant prominence in computational
and systems neuroscience as a general theory of brain and behaviour [1,2]. This
framework uses one single principle—surprise (or free energy) minimization—
to explain perception and action. It has been applied to a variety of domains,
which includes perception–action loops and perceptual learning [3,4]; Bayes
optimal sensorimotor integration and predictive control [5]; action selection
[6,7] and goal-directed behaviour [8–12].
Active inference starts from the fundaments of self-organization which
suggests that any adaptive agent needs to maintain its biophysical states
within limits, therefore maintaining a generalized homeostasis that enables it
to resist the second law of thermodynamics [2]. To this aim, both an agent’s
actions and perceptions both need to minimize surprise, that is, a measure of
discrepancy between the agent’s current predictive or desired states. Crucially,
agents cannot minimize surprise directly but they can minimize an upper
bound of surprise, namely the free energy of their beliefs about the causes of
sensory input [1,2].
This idea is cast in terms of Bayesian inference: the agent is endowed with
priors that describe its desired states and a (hierarchical, generative) model of
the world. It uses the model to generate continuous predictions that it tries to
fulfil via action; that is to say, the agent activity samples the world to minimize
prediction errors so that surprise (or its upper bound, free-energy) is sup-
pressed. More formally, this is a process in which beliefs about (hidden or
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of observations, while observations are sampled selectively to
conform to the model [13,14]. The agent has essentially two
ways to reduce surprise: change its beliefs or hypotheses
(perception), or change the world (action). For example, if it
believes that its arm is raised, but observes it is not, then it
can either change its mind or to raise the arm—either way,
its prediction comes true (and free energy is minimized).
As we see, in active inference, this result can be obtained
by endowing a Bayesian filtering scheme with reflex arcs
that enable action, such as raising a robotic arm or using it
to touch a target. In this example, the agent generates a (pro-
prioceptive) prediction corresponding to the sensation of
raising alarm, and reflex arcs fulfil this prediction effectively
raising the hand (and minimizing surprise).
Active inference has clear relevance for robotic motor con-
trol. As in optimal motor control [15,16], it relies on optimality
principles and (Bayesian) state estimation; however, it has
some unique features such as the fact that it dispenses with
inverse models (see the Discussion). Similar to planning-as-
inference and KL control [17–22], it uses Bayesian inference,
but it is based on the minimization of a free-energy functional
that generalizes conventional cost or utility functions.
Although the computations underlying Bayesian inference or
free-energy minimization are generally hard, they become
tractable as active inference uses variational inference, usually
under the Laplace assumption, which enables one to summar-
ize beliefs about hidden states with a single quantity (the
conditional mean). The resulting (neural) code corresponds
to the Laplace code, which is simple and efficient [3].
Despite its success in computational and systems neuro-
science, active inference is less known in related domains
such as motor control and robotics. For example, it remains
unproven that the framework can be adopted in challenging
robotic set-ups. In this article, we ask if active inference can
be effectively used to control the 7-DoF arm of a PR2 robot
(simulated using Robot Operating System (ROS)). We present
a series of robot reaching simulations under various conditions
(with or without noise on vision and/or proprioception), in
order to test the feasibility of this computational scheme in
robotics. Furthermore, by analysing the internal system
dynamics (e.g. thedynamicsof thehidden states that are inferred
during the inference), our study sheds light on key aspects of the
framework such as the quintessentially multimodal nature of
control and the relative roles of proprioception and vision.
Finally, besides providing a proof of principle for the usage of
active inference in robotics, our simulations help to illustrate
the differences between this scheme and alternative approaches
in computational neuroscience and robotics, such as optimal
control, and the significance of these differences from both a
technological and biological perspective.2. Methods
In this section, we first define, mathematically, the active infer-
ence framework (for the continuous case). We then describe its
application to robotic control and reaching.
2.1. Active inference formalism
The free-energy term that is optimized (minimized) during
action control rests on the tuple ðV,C,S,A,R, q, pÞ [23].
A real-valued random variable is denoted by X :V . . . ! Rand x [ X for a particular value. The tilde notation
~x ¼ ðx, x0, x0 0, . . .Þ corresponds to variables in generalized coordi-
nates of motion [24]. Each prime is a temporal derivative. p(X )
denotes a probability density.
— V is the sample space from which random fluctuations v [ V
are drawn.
— Hidden states C :C AV! R. They depend on actions
and are part of the dynamics of the world that causes sensory
states.
— Sensory states S :C AV! R. They are the agent’s sen-
sations and constitute a probabilistic mapping from action
and hidden states.
— Action A :S R ! R. They are the agent’s actions and depend
on its sensory and internal states.
— Internal states R :R SV! R. They depend on sensory
states and cause actions. They constitute the dynamics of
states of the agent.
— A recognition density qð~Cj~mÞ, which corresponds to the
agent’s beliefs about the causes C (and brain state m describ-
ing those beliefs).
— A generative density pð~C,~sjmÞ corresponding to the density
of probabilities of the sensory states s and world states C,
knowing the predictive model m of the agent.
According to Ashby [25], in order to restrict themselves in a
limited number of states, an agent must minimize the dispersion
of its sensory and hidden states. The Shannon entropy corre-
sponds to the dispersion of the external states (here S  C).
Under ergodic assumption, this entropy equals the long-term
average of Gibbs energy
HðS,CÞ ¼ kGð~C, ~sjmÞlt
G ¼  ln pð~C, ~sjmÞ:
9=
; ð2:1Þ
One can see that the Gibbs energy is defined in terms of the gen-
erative model. k:l is the expectation or the mean under a density
when indicated. However, agents cannot minimize this energy
directly, because hidden states are unknown by definition.
However, mathematically
HðS,CÞ ¼ HðSÞ þHðCjSÞ
¼ k ln pð~sðtÞjmÞ þHðCjS ¼ ~sðtÞÞlt:
ð2:2Þ
With this latter equation, we observe that sensory surprise
 ln pð~sðtÞjmÞ minimizes the entropy of the external states and
can be minimized through action if action minimizes conditional
entropy. In this sense
aðtÞ ¼ arg min
a
ð ln pð~sðtÞjmÞÞ
~mðtÞ ¼ arg min
~m
ðHðCjS ¼ ~sðtÞÞÞ:
9>=
>; ð2:3Þ
Unfortunately, we cannot minimize sensory surprise directly
(see equation (2.3)) as this entails a marginalization over hidden
states which is intractable
 ln pð~sjmÞ ¼  ln
ð
pðC,~sjmÞ dC: ð2:4Þ
Happily, there is a solution to this problem that comes
from theoretical physics [26] and machine learning [27]
called variational free energy, which furnishes an upper bound
on surprise. This is a functional of the conditional density,
which minimized by action and internal states, to produce
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aðtÞ ¼ arg min
a
Fð~sðtÞ, ~mðtÞÞ
~mðtÞ ¼ arg min
~m
Fð~sðtÞ, ~mÞ
Fðs,mÞ ¼ kGð~C, ~sjmÞlq þH½qð~Cj~mÞ
¼ D½qð~Cj~mÞjjpð~Cj~smÞ  ln pð~sðaÞjmÞ
  ln pð~sðaÞjmÞ:
9>>>>>>=
>>>>>>;
ð2:5Þ
The term D½:jj: is the Kullback–Leibler divergence (or cross-
entropy) between two densities. The minimizations on a and ~m
correspond to action and perception, respectively, where the
internal states ~m parametrize the conditional density q. We
need perception in order to use free energy to finesse the (intract-
able) evaluation of surprise. The Kullback–Leibler term is
non-negative, and the free energy is therefore always greater
than surprise as we can see it in the last inequality. When free
energy is minimized, it approximates surprise and as a result,
the conditional density q approximates the posterior density
over external states
D½qð~Cj~mÞjjpð~Cj~smÞ  0)
qð~Cj~mÞ  pð~Cj~smÞ
H½qð~Cj~mÞ  HðCjS ¼ ~sÞ
(
:
ð2:6Þ
This completes a description of approximate Bayesian infer-
ence (active inference) within the variational framework. This
free-energy formulation resolves several issues in perception
and action control problems, but in the following, we focus on
action control. According to equation (2.5), free energy can be
minimized using actions via its effect on hidden states and sen-
sation. In this case, action changes the sensations to match the
agent’s expectations.
The only outstanding issue is the nature of the generative
model used to explain and sample sensations. In continuous
time formulations, the generative model is usually expressed in
terms of coupled (stochastic) differential equations. These
equations describe the dynamics of the (hidden) states of the
world and the ensuing behaviour of an agent [5]. This leads us
to a discussion of the agent’s generative model.2.2. The generative model
Active inference generally assumes that the generative model
supporting perception and action is nonlinear, dynamic and
deep (i.e. hierarchical), of the sort that might be entailed by
cortical and subcortical hierarchies in the brain [28].
s ¼ gðx,v, aÞ þ ws
x ¼ fðx, v, aÞ þ wx
_a ¼ @aFð~s,~mÞ
_~m ¼ D~m @~mFð~s, ~mÞ:
9>=
>; ð2:7Þ
In bold, we have real-world states and in italic, internal states
of the agent. s is the sensory input, x corresponds to hidden
states, v to hidden causes of the world and a to action. Intuitively,
hidden states and causes are used by the brain as abstract quan-
tities in order to predict sensations. Dynamics over time is linked
by hidden states, whereas the hierarchical levels are linked by
hidden causes. The~notation means that we are using general-
ized coordinates of motion, i.e. a vector of positions, velocities,
accelerations, etc. [5]. ~s, ~n and a corresponds to sensory input,
conditional expectations and action, respectively.
One can observe a coupling between these differential
equations: sensory states depend upon action a(t) via causes
(x, v) and the functions (f, g). While action depends upon sen-
sory states via internal states ~nðtÞ. These differential equations
are stochastic owing to random fluctuations (vx, vv).A generalized gradient descent on variational free energy is
defined in the second pair of equations. This method is termed
generalized filtering and rests on conditional expectations to pro-
duce a prediction (first) term and an update (second) term
based upon free-energy gradients that, as we see below, can be
expressed in terms of prediction errors (this corresponds to the
basic form of a Kalman filter). D is a differential matrix operator
that operates on generalized motion and D~m describes the gener-
alized motion of conditional expectations. Generalized motion
comprises vectors of velocity, acceleration, jerk, etc.
The generative model has the following hierarchical form
s ¼ gð1Þðxð1Þ, nð1ÞÞ þ vð1Þn
_x ¼ f ð1Þðx, nð1ÞÞ þ vð1Þx
..
.
nði1Þ ¼ gðiÞðxðiÞ, nðiÞÞ þ vðiÞn
_xðiÞ ¼ f ðiÞðx, nðiÞÞ þ vðiÞx
..
.
9>>>>>=
>>>>>;
ð2:8Þ
The level of the hierarchy in the generative model corre-
sponds to i. f(i) and g(i) and their Gaussian random fluctuations
vx and vv on the motion of hidden states and causes define a
probability density over sensations, causes of the world and
hidden states that constitute the free energy of posterior or con-
ditional (Bayesian) beliefs about the causes of sensations. Note
that the generative model becomes probabilistic because of
the random fluctuations (where sensory or sensor noise corre-
sponds to fluctuations at the first level of the hierarchy and at
fluctuations at higher levels induces uncertainty about hidden
states). The inverse of the covariances matrices of these random
fluctuations is called precision (i.e. inverse covariance) and is
denoted by ðPðiÞx , PðiÞn Þ.2.3. Prediction errors and predictive coding
We can now define prediction errors on the hidden causes and
states. These auxiliary variables represent the difference between
conditional expectations and their predicted values based on the
level above. Using A  B :¼ AT  B:
_~mðiÞx ¼ D~mðiÞx þ
@~gðiÞ
@~mðiÞx
PðiÞn ~1ðiÞn
þ @
~f
ðiÞ
@~mðiÞx
PðiÞx ~1ðiÞx DPðiÞx ~1ðiÞx
_~mðiÞn ¼ D~mðiÞn þ
@~gðiÞ
@~mðiÞ
PðiÞn ~1ðiÞn
þ @
~f
ðiÞ
@~mðiÞn
PðiÞx ~1ðiÞx Pðiþ1Þn ~1ðiþ1Þn
~1ðiÞx ¼ D~mðiÞx  ~f
ðiÞð~mðiÞx , ~mðiÞn Þ
~1ðiÞn ¼ ~mði1Þn  ~gðiÞð~mðiÞx , ~mðiÞn Þ
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>>>>>;
ð2:9Þ
~1ðiÞn and ~1
ðiÞ
x correspond to prediction errors on hidden causes and
hidden states, respectively. The precisions PðiÞn and P
ðiÞ
x weights
the prediction errors, so that more precise prediction errors
have a greater influence during generalized filtering.
The derivation of equation (2.8) enables us to express the
gradients equation (2.7) in terms of prediction errors. Effectively,
precise prediction errors update the prediction to provide a
Bayes optimal estimate of hidden states as a continuous function
of time—where free energy corresponds to the sum of the
squared prediction error (weighted by precision) at each level
of the hierarchy. Heuristically, this corresponds to an instan-
taneous gradient ascent in which prediction errors are
Figure 1. PR2 robot simulated using ROS [29].
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explanation of the mathematics under this scheme, see [24].
2.4. Action
A motor trajectory (e.g. the trajectory of raising the arm) is pro-
duced via classical reflex arcs that suppress proprioceptive
prediction errors
_a ¼ @aF ¼ ð@a~1ð1Þn Þ Pð1Þn ~1ð1Þn ð2:10Þ
Intuitively, conditional expectations in the generative model
drive (top-down) proprioceptive predictions (e.g. the propriocep-
tive sensation of raising one’s own arm), and these predictions
are fulfilled by reflex arcs. This is because the only way for an
agent to minimize its free energy through action (and suppress
proprioceptive prediction errors) is to change proprioceptive sig-
nals, i.e. raise the arm and realize the predicted proprioceptive
sensations. According to this scheme, reflex arcs thus produce
a motor trajectory (raising the arm) to comply with set points
or trajectories prescribed by descending proprioceptive predic-
tions (cf. motor commands). At the neurobiological level, this
process is thought to occur at the level of cranial nerve nuclei
and spinal cord.
2.5. Application to robotic arm control and reaching
Having described the general active inference formalism, we now
illustrate how it can be used to elicit reaching movements with a
robot: the 7-DoF arm of a PR2 robot simulated using the ROS
[29] (figure 1). Essentially, in our simulations, the robot has to
reach a target by moving (i.e. raising) its arm. We see that
the key aspect of this behaviour rests on a multimodal integra-
tion of visual and proprioceptive signals [30,31], which play
differential—yet interconnected—roles.
In this robotic setting, the hidden states are the angle of the
joints ðx1, x2, . . . , x7Þ. The visual input is the position of the
end effector, here the arm of the PR2 robot. This location
ðn1, n2, n3Þ can be seen as autonomous causal states. We
assume that the robot knows the true mapping between
the position of its hand Pos and the angles of its joints. In
other words, we assume that the robot knows its forward
model and can extract the true position of its end effector in
three-dimensional coordinates into the visual space.
gðx, nÞ ¼ gðx, nÞ ¼
x
n
Pos
2
4
3
5 ð2:11Þ
If we assume a Newtonian dynamics with viscosity k and
elasticity k, then we obtain the subsequent equations of
motion that describe the true (physical) evolution of hidden
states
fðx˜, vÞ ¼
_x1
_x2
..
.
_x7
_x01
_x02
..
.
_x07
2
6666666666664
3
7777777777775
¼
x01
x02
..
.
x07
ða1  k1x1  k1x01Þ
m1
ða2  k1x2  k1x02Þ
m1
ða3  k1x3  k1x03Þ
m1
ða4  k2x4  k2x04Þ
m2
ða5  k2x5  k2x05Þ
m2
..
.
ða7  k2x7  k2x07Þ=m2
2
6666666666666666666666666666664
3
7777777777777777777777777777775
ð2:12ÞThe behaviour of the robot arm during its reaching task is
specified in terms of the robot’s prior beliefs that constitute its
generative model. Here, these beliefs are based upon a basic
but efficient feedback control. In other words, by specifying a
particular generative model, we create a robot that thinks it
will behave in a particular way: in this instance, we think it
behaves as an efficient feedback controller, as follows. Within
the joint configuration space (thanks to geometrical consider-
ations), the prior control law provides a per-joint angular
increment to be applied according to the position of the end
effector, allowing its convergence towards the target position.
In order to avoid the singular configurations of the PR2 arm,
two actions a and b are superposed. The first one is a per-joint
action: each joint tries to align the portion of arm it supports
with the target position. The second action is distributed over
the shoulder, and the elbow providing the flexion–extension
primitive in order to reach or escape the singular configurations
of the first action (e.g. stretched arm).
Let T ¼ (t1, t2, t3) be the target position in the Euclidean
space, Ji ¼ ðji1, ji2, ji3Þ the position of the joint i in W, W ¼ R3,
w ¼ T  J the vector describing the shortest path in W to reach
the target, fi ¼ Ti  J=jjTi  Jjj the unit vector linking each
joint to the arm’s distal extremity, Posi ¼ ðPosi1, Posi2, Posi3Þ
the unit vector collinear to the rotation axis of the joint i. Let ‘’
be the dot product inW and ‘’ the cross product. The feedback
error to be regulated to zero by the first action of the control law
for the joint i is
ei ¼ ðw fiÞ  Posi: ð2:13Þ
Classically, the first action is designed as a PI controller that
ensures
_ei ¼ ai ¼ ppei þ pi
ðt¼t0
t¼0
eiðtÞ dt, ð2:14Þ
where t0 is the current time and fpp,pig are two positive settings
used to adjust the convergence rate. To preclude wind-up
phenomena, the absolute value of the integral term is bounded
by amax . 0.
To operate as expected, the second action needs to predict
the influence of the ‘stretched arm’ singularity. This is
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dot products
gm ¼
w
jjwjj 
f2
jjf2jj


gc ¼ w  f2,
9=
; ð2:15Þ
where the absolute value of gc is bounded by gmax . 0. Then, the
second action is defined as
b1 ¼ b3 ¼ b5 ¼ b6 ¼ b7 ¼ 0
b2 ¼ gmgcp p2 ðshoulderÞ
b4 ¼ gmgcp p4 ðelbowÞ,
9=
; ð2:16Þ
where pp2 and pp4 are additional positive settings used to balance
the contribution of the two joints (roughly: pp2 ¼ pp4=2). Finally,
the controller provides the empirical prior
Fi ¼ ai þ bi: ð2:17Þ
In practice, to obtain reasonable behaviour, the controller set-
tings were chosen as: pp ¼ 0.3, pi ¼ 0.01, amax ¼ 0.001, pp2 ¼ 2.25,
pp4 ¼ 5, gmax ¼ 0.1.
Finally, we obtain the following generative model
f ð~x,nÞ ¼
_x1
_x2
..
.
_x7
_x01
_x02
..
.
_x07
2
6666666666664
3
7777777777775
¼
x01
x02
..
.
x07
ðF1  k1x1  k1x01Þ
m1
ðF2  k1x2  k1x02Þ
m1
ðF3  k1x3  k1x03Þ
m1
ðF4  k2x4  k2x04Þ
m2
ðF5  k2x5  k2x05Þ
m2
..
.
ðF7  k2x7  k2x07Þ
m2
:
2
666666666666666666666666666666664
3
777777777777777777777777777777775
ð2:18Þ
Importantly, we see that the generative model has a very
different form from the true equations of motion. In other
words, the generative model has prior beliefs that render
motor behaviour purposeful. It is this enriched generative
model that produces goal-directed behaviour, which fulfils the
robot’s predictions and minimizes surprise. In this instance,
the agent believes it is going to move with its arm towards the
target until it touches it. The distance between the end effector
and the target is used as an error that drives the motion, as if
the end effector is pulled to the target. The ensuing movement
therefore resolves the Bernstein’s problem that tries to solve the
converse problem of pushing the end effector towards the
target (which is an ill-posed problem). This formulation of
motor control is related to the equilibrium point hypothesis
[32] and the passive motion paradigm [33,34] and, crucially,
dispenses with inverse models. Note that no solution of an
optimal control problem is required here. This is because the
causes of desired behaviour are specified explicitly by the gener-
ative or forward model (the arm is pulled to a target), and do
not have to be inferred from desired consequences; see section
Discussion for a comparison of active inference and optimal
control schemes.3. Results
We tested the model in four scenarios. In all the scenarios, the
robot arm started from a fixed starting position and had toreach a desired position in three dimensions with its 7-DoF
arm. We simulated various starting and desired positions,
but in this illustration, we focus on the sample problem
illustrated in figure 2, where the start position is on the
bottom-centre, and the desired position is the green dot.
The four panels of figure 2 exemplify the robot reaching
under the four scenarios that we considered. In the first scen-
ario (figure 2a), there was no noise on proprioception and
vision. In the second, third and fourth scenarios, propriocep-
tion (figure 2b), vision (figure 2c) or both (figure 2d ) were
noisy, respectively. We used noise with a log precision of 4.
As illustrated by the figures, in the absence of noise (first
scenario), the reaching trajectory is flawless and free of static
error (figure 2a). Trajectories become less accurate when
either proprioception (second scenario) or vision (third scen-
ario) are noisy, still the arm reaches the desired target
(figure 2b,c). However, when both proprioception and
vision are noisy, the arm becomes largely unable to reach
the target (figure 2d ).
A more direct comparison between the four scenarios is
possible, if one considers the average of 20 simulations
from a common starting point (figure 3). Here, the four col-
ours correspond to the four scenarios: first scenario (no
noise) is blue; second scenario (noisy proprioception) is
black, third scenario (noisy vision) is red and fourth scenario
(noisy proprioception and vision) is yellow. To compare the
trajectories under the four scenarios quantitatively, we com-
puted the sum of Euclidian distances between the position
of the end effector for each iteration of the algorithm under
the best trajectory (corresponding to scenario 1) and the
other trajectories. We obtained a difference between the
normal and noisy proprioception scenarios of 0.2796;
between normal and noisy vision scenarios of 0.143; and a
difference between the normal and noisy proprioception
and vision scenarios of 1.2169.
These differences can be better appreciated if one con-
siders the internal dynamics of the system’s hidden states
(i.e. angles of the arm) during the different conditions, as
shown in figures 4–7 for the simulations without noise,
noisy proprioception, noisy vision and noisy proprioception
and vision, respectively. The hidden states are inferred
while the agent optimizes its expectations as described
above (see equation (2.12)). In turn, action (a(t)) is selected
based on the hidden states (technically, action is part of the
generative process but not the generative model).
The four panels of figures 4–7 show the conditional pre-
dictions and prediction errors during the task. In each figure,
the top right panel shows the hidden states, and the grey
areas correspond to 90% Bayesian confidence intervals. The
figures show that adding noise to proprioception (figure 5)
makes the confidence interval much larger compared with
a standard case with no noise (figure 4). Confidence intervals
further increase when both proprioception and vision are
noisy (figure 7). The top left panel shows the conditional pre-
dictions of sensory signals (coloured lines) and sensory
prediction errors (red). These are errors on the proprioceptive
and visual input, and are small in relation to predictions. The
bottom left panel shows the true expectation (dotted line) and
conditional expectation (solid line) about hidden causes. The
bottom right panel shows actions (coloured lines) and true
causes (dotted lines). In the noisy proprioception scenario
(figure 5), one of the hidden states (top right panel) and
one action (bottom right panel) rises with time. This
0.5
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Figure 2. Reaching trajectories in three dimensions from a start to a goal location under four scenarios. (a) Scenario 1: reaching in three dimensions with 7 DoF.
(b) Scenario 2: reaching in three dimensions with noisy proprioception. (c) Scenario 3: reaching in three dimensions with noisy vision. (d ) Scenario 4: reaching in
three dimensions with noisy proprioception and vision. The blue trajectory is the mean of 20 trajectories shown in grey.
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(scenario 4). The trajectories are the mean of 20 simulations from the
same start and goal (green) locations.
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
J.R.Soc.Interface
13:20160616
6
 on December 21, 2016http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from corresponds to an internal degree of freedom that does not
have any effect on the trajectory. The figures show some
slight oscillations after 20 iterations, which are due to the
fact that the arm is moving in the proximity of the target.4. Discussion
Our case study shows that the active inference scheme can
control the seven DoFs arm of a simulated PR2 robot—focus-
ing here on the task of reaching a desired goal location from a
(predefined) start location.
Our results illustrate that action control is accurate with
intact proprioception and vision, and only partly impaired if
noise is added to either of these modalities. The comparison
of the trajectories of figure 2b,c shows that adding noise to pro-
prioception is more problematic. The analysis of the dynamics
of internal system variables (figures 4–7) helps us understand-
ing the above results, highlighting the differential roles of
proprioception and vision in this scheme. In the noisy proprio-
ception scenario (figure 5), hidden states are significantly more
uncertain compared with the reference case with no noise
(figure 4). Yet, despite the uncertainty about joint angles, the
robot can still rely on (intact) vision to infer where the arm is
in space, and thus it is able to reach the target ultimately—
although it follows largely suboptimal trajectories (in relation
to its prior beliefs preferences). Multimodal integration or com-
pensation is impossible if both vision and proprioception are
sufficiently degraded (figure 7). In the noisy vision scenario,
figure 6, noise has some effect on inferred causes but only
affects hidden states (and ultimately action selection) to a
minor extent.
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Figure 4. Dynamics of the model internal variables in the normal case. The conditional predictions and expectations are shown as functions of the iterations. (a) the
panel shows the conditional predictions (coloured lines) and the corresponding prediction errors (red lines) based upon the expected states on the upper right.
(b) The coloured lines represent the expected hidden states causing sensory predictions. These can be thought of displacements in the articulatory state space. In this
panel and throughout, the grey areas denote 90% Bayesian confidence intervals. (c) The dotted lines represent the true expectation and the solid lines show the
conditional expectation of the hidden cause. (d) Action (solid line) and true causes (dotted line).
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essentially multimodal and based on both vision and
proprioception, and adding noise to either modality can be
(partially) compensated for by appealing to the other, more
precise dimension. However, proprioception and vision
play differential roles in this scheme. Proprioception has a
direct effect on hidden states and action selection; this is
because action dynamics depend on reflex arcs that suppress
proprioceptive (not visual) prediction errors (see §2.4). If the
robot has poor proprioceptive information, then it can
use multimodal integration and the visual modality to com-
pensate and restore efficient control. However, if both
modalities are degraded with noise, then multimodal inte-
gration becomes imprecise, and the robot cannot reduce
error accurately—at least in the simplified control scheme
assumed here, which (on purpose) does not include any
additional corrective mechanism. Adding noise to vision is
less problematic, given that in the (reaching) task considered
here, it plays a more ancillary role. Indeed, our reaching task
does not pose strong demands on the estimation of hidden
causes for accurate control; the situation may be differentif one requires, for example, to estimate the pose of a
to-be-grasped object.
The above-mentioned results are consistent with a large
body of studies showing the importance of proprioception
for control tasks. Patients with impaired proprioception can
still execute motor tasks such as reaching, grasping and loco-
motion, but their performance is suboptimal [35–38]. In
principle, the scheme proposed here may be used to explain
human data under impaired proprioception [4] or other def-
icits in motor control—or even to help design rehabilitation
therapies. In this perspective, an interesting issue that we
have not addressed pertains to the attenuation of propriocep-
tive prediction errors during movement. Heuristically, this
sensory attenuation is necessary to allow the prior beliefs of
the generative model to supervene over the sensory evidence
that movement has not yet occurred (or in other words, to
prevent internal states encoding the fact that there is no
movement). This speaks to a dynamic gain control that med-
iates the attenuation of the precision of prediction errors
during movement. In the example shown above, we simply
reduced the precision of ascending proprioceptive prediction
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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Figure 5. (a–d) Dynamics of the model internal variables in the noisy proprioception case. The layout of the figure is the same as figure 4. Please see the previous
figure legends for details.
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the ensuing failure of sensory attenuation would have sub-
verted movement; perhaps in a similar way to the poverty
of movements seen in Parkinson’s disease—a disease that
degrades motor performance profoundly [39]. This aspect
of precision or gain control suggests that being able to
implement active inference in robots will allow us to perform
simulated psychophysical experiments to illustrate sensory
attenuation and its impairments. Furthermore, it suggests a
robotic model of Parkinson’s disease is in reach, providing
an interesting opportunity for simulating pathophysiology.
Clearly, some of our choices when specifying the genera-
tive model are heuristic—or appeal to established notions.
For example, adding a derivative term to equation (2.14)
could change the dynamics in an interesting way. In general,
the framework shown above accommodates questions about
alternative models and dynamics through Bayesian model
comparison. In principle, we have an objective function (vari-
ational free energy) that scores the quality of any generative
model entertained by a robot—in relation to its embodied
exchange with the environment. This means we could
change the generative model and assess the quality of the
ensuing behaviour using variational free energy—and select
the best generative model in exactly the same way thatpeople characterize experimental data by comparing the evi-
dence for different models in Bayesian model comparison.
We hope to explore this in future work.
We next hope to port the scheme to a real robot. This will
be particularly interesting, because there are several facets of
active inference that are more easily demonstrated in a real-
world artefact. These aspects include a robustness to exogen-
ous perturbations. For example, the movement trajectory
should gracefully recover from any exogenous forces applied
to the arm during movement. Furthermore, theoretically, the
active inference scheme is also robust to differences between
the true motor plant and the various kinematic constants in
the generative model. This robustness follows from the fact
that the movement is driven by (fictive) forces whose fixed
points do not change with exogenous perturbations—or
many parameters of the generative model (or process).
Another interesting advantage of real-world implementations
will be the opportunity to examine robustness to sensorimotor
delays. Although not necessarily a problem from a purely
robotics perspective, biological robots suffer non-trivial
delays in the signalling of ascending sensory signals and des-
cending motor predictions. In principle, these delays can be
absorbed into the generative model—as has been illustrated
in the context of oculomotor control [40]. At present, these
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Figure 6. (a–d) Dynamics of the model internal variables in the noisy vision case. The layout of the figure is the same as figure 4. Please see the previous figure
legends for details.
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oculomotor tracking remain hypothetical. It would be extre-
mely useful to see if they could be tested in a robotics setting.
As noted above, active inference shares many similarities
with the passive movement paradigm (PMP, [33,34]). Although
strictly speaking, active inference is a corollary of the free-
energy principle, it inherits the philosophy of the PMP in the
following sense. Active inference is equipped with a generative
model that maps from causes to consequences. In the setting of
motor control, the causes are forces that have some desired
fixed point or orbit. It is then a simple matter to predict the
sensory consequences of those forces—as sensed by proprio-
ception or robotic sensors. These sensory predictions can
then be realized through open loop control (e.g. peripheral
servos or reflex arcs); thereby realizing the desired fixed point
(cf. the equilibrium point hypothesis [32]). However, unlike the
equilibrium point hypothesis, active inference is open loop.
This is because its motor predictions are informed by deep gen-
erative models that are sensitive to input from all modalities
(including proprioception). The fact that action realizes the
(sensory) consequences of (prior) causes explains why there
is no need for an inverse model.
Optimal motor control formulations [15,16] are fundamen-
tally different. Briefly, optimal control operates by minimizing
some cost function in order to compute motor commands for arobot performing a particular motor task. Optimal control
theory requires a mechanism for state estimation as well as
two internal models: an inverse and forward model. This
scheme also assumes that the appropriate optimality equation
can be solved [41]. In contrast, active inference uses prior
beliefs about the movement (in an extrinsic frame of reference)
instead of optimal control signals for movements (in an intrin-
sic frame of reference). In active inference, there is no inverse
model or cost function and the resulting trajectories are
Bayes optimal. This contrasts with optimal control, which
calls on the inverse model to finesse problems incurred by sen-
sorimotor noise and delays. Inverse models are not required in
active inference, because the robot’s generative (or forward)
model is inverted during the inference. Active inference also
dispenses with cost functions, as these are replaced by the
robot’s (prior) beliefs (of note, there is a general duality
between control and inference [15,16]). In brief, replacing the
cost function with prior beliefs means that minimizing cost
corresponds to maximizing the marginal likelihood of a gen-
erative model [42–44]. A formal correspondence between
cost functions and prior beliefs can be established with the
complete class theorem [45,46], according to which there is
at least one prior belief and cost function that can produce a
Bayes-optimal motor behaviour. In sum, optimal control for-
mulations start with a desired endpoint (consequence) and
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desired consequences. It is this construction that poses a diffi-
cult inverse problem with solutions that are not generally
robust—and are often problematic in robot control. Active
inference finesses this problem by starting with the causes of
movement, as opposed to the consequences.
Accordingly, one can see the solutions offered under opti-
mal control as special cases of the solutions available under
an (active) inferential scheme. This is because some policies
cannot be specified using cost functions but can be described
using priors; specifically, this is the case of solenoidal move-
ments, whose cost is equal for every part of the trajectory
[47]. This comes from variational calculus, which says that
a trajectory or a policy has several components: a curl-free
component that changes value and a divergence-free com-
ponent that does not change value. The divergence-free
motion can be only specified by a prior and not by a cost
function. Discussing the relative benefits of control schemes
with or without cost functions and inverse models is
beyond the scope of this article. Here, it suffice to say that
inverse models are generally hard to learn for robots, and
cost functions sometimes need to be defined in ad hoc
manner for robot control tasks. By eluding these constraints,
active inference may offer a promising alternative to optimal
control schemes. For a more detailed discussion on the links
between optimal control and active inference, see [47].Although active inference resolves many problems that
attend optimal control schemes, there is no free lunch. In
active inference, all the heavy lifting is done by the generative
model—and in particular, the priors that define desired set-
points or orbits. The basic idea is to induce these attractors
by specifying appropriate equations of motion within the
generative model of the robot. This means that the art of
generating realistic and purposeful behaviour reduces to
creating equations of motion that have desired attractors.
These can be simple fixed-point attractors as in the example
above. They could also be much more complicated, pro-
ducing quasi-periodic motion (as in walking) or fluent
sequences of movements specified by heteroclinic cycles.
All the more interesting theoretical examples in the theoreti-
cal literature to date rest upon some form of itinerant
dynamics inherent in the generative model that sometimes
have deep structure. A nice example of this is the handwrit-
ing example in [48] that used Lotka–Volterra equations to
specify a sequence of saddle points—producing a series of
movements. Simpler examples could use both attracting
and repelling fixed points that correspond to contact points
and collision points, respectively, to address more practical
issues in robotics. Irrespective of the particular repertoire of
attractors implicit in the generative model, the hierarchi-
cal aspect of the generative models that underlie active
inference enables the composition of movements, sequences
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words, provided one can write down (or learn) a deep gen-
erative model with itinerant dynamics, there is a possibility
of simulating realistic movements that inherit deep temporal
structure and context sensitivity.
In conclusion, in this article, we have presented a proof-
of-concept implementation of robot control using active
inference, a biologically motivated scheme that is gaining
prominence in computational and systems neuroscience.
The results discussed here demonstrate the feasibility of the
scheme; having said this, further work is necessary to fully
demonstrate how this scheme works in more challenging
domains or whether it has advantages (from both technologi-
cal and biological viewpoints) over alternative control
schemes. Future work will address an implementation of
the above scheme on a real robot with the same degrees of
freedom as the PR2. Other predictive models could be devel-
oped, the generative model illustrated above is very simple
and does not take advantage of the internal degrees of free-
dom. A key generalization will be integrating planning
mechanisms that may allow, for example, the robot to pro-
actively avoid obstacles or collisions during movement—ormore generally, to consider future (predicted) and not only
currently sensed contingencies [17,52–56]. Planning mechan-
isms have been described under the active inference scheme
and can solve challenging problems such as the mountain–
car problem [5], and can thus been seamlessly integrated in
the model presented here—speaking to the scalability of the
active inference scheme. Finally, one reason for using a bio-
logically realistic model such as active inference is that it
may be possible to directly map internal dynamics generated
by the robot simulator (e.g. of hidden states) to brain signals
(e.g. EEG signals reflecting predictions and prediction errors)
generated during equivalent action planning or performance.
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